《世界报业辛迪加》网站7月11日刊登伦敦经济学院教授、达沃斯论坛全球青年领袖金刻羽文章《“走着瞧”的艺术》
文：金刻羽
译：周枝萍
不要对中美两国达成最终的贸易协定抱有太大希望。因为事情的发展跟美国总统特朗普的预期似乎不太一致，中国人并没有走到志穷计竭的地步，也不会突然顺从于他的要求。
成功的谈判通常需要双方理解彼此的出发点。中国处理这场争端的方式方法固然有值得商榷的地方，但美国必须更深入地理解中国的短期和长期思维，否则谈判就不会取得什么进展。
特朗普的支持者们坚持认为，特朗普尽管有时候言辞轻浮，但他应该被认真对待。中国领导层似乎也同意这样的看法。中方虽然没把特朗普政府某些过分的、无理的要求真正当回事，但却毫不含糊地认为美方的目标就是要继续压制中国。这个目标与美国企业对中国一些具体的担忧关系不大，倒更像是源自美国对另一个文明乃至种族的敌意。因此，中国不得不对短期和长期的战略算计做出调整。
最近，中美两国领导人在日本大阪取得了暂停“关税战”的共识。展望未来，中国处理这场贸易争端的总方针都将是保持冷静，沉着应对。在回顾过去一段时间的策略时，中方发现自己在贸易争端爆发初期对与美国达成协定表现得过于积极，反倒使对方觉得自己软弱可欺。中国现在明白了，只要向特朗普做一点小让步，他就会得寸进尺、变本加厉地想占大便宜。在今年五月的中美上一轮谈判中，中国做出了重大让步，结果美国还威胁要对中国商品提高关税；即便现在处于休战期，也只是不新增关税，现有关税保持不变。
中国政府最不能接受的一件事，就是被人拿来跟丧权辱国的晚清政府相提并论。基于两个判断，中国目前采取了静观其变的策略。第一，中国认为特朗普胡打乱砸的做法将继续对美国经济造成严重破坏，而经济压力可能迫使他在备战2020年总统大选时对中国采取退让态度。
其二，特朗普鼓吹靠关税威胁墨西哥的做法是一种胜利，中国人知道这种作秀只是为了平复美国市场越来越突出的震荡；最新的美墨协议几乎完全建立在此前的旧协议上，特朗普所谓的墨西哥做出让步纯属子虚乌有。如论如何，中国不会急于做出让步，因为市场的不安心态随时可能迫使美方改变谈判立场。
更关键的是，中国领导层怀疑特朗普醉翁之意不在协议，而在于削弱中国经济，所以他们必将为谈判再次破裂做好准备。为了控制贸易战的经济成本，中国已经启用了一系列补偿性政策杠杆，而这些杠杆是美国所不具备的，包括财政和货币刺激、鼓励借贷，巩固金融系统等。在这些政策的作用下，中国靠人民币贬值扭转了关税带来的竞争劣势。
有一种看法在中国变得越来越主流，即哪怕美国在贸易上手段再高、优势再大，都远远不及中国人民抗压的意志力。他们将做出必要的牺牲，来维护民族自豪感，不让国家屈服于西方。、在了解上世纪80年代的美日贸易冲突之后，中国人进一步坚定了爱国决心。
《孙子兵法》有云，“知己知彼，百战不殆”。多年来，中国领导层一直遵循着这个建议，花极大的精力去了解美国内部的政治动态。他们知道，特朗普正在利用美国根深蒂固的恐华情绪，也知道应对这样的美国不能光靠战术层面的管控，还必须靠战略层面的调整。
因此，中国人已经认识到，应对一场旷日持久的贸易战不能仅仅依靠国内经济政策和自力更生的态度，还需要在国际上结交新朋友，并与老对手缓和关系。这就是为什么中国正在改善中日和中俄关系。如果没有克里姆林宫的默许，“一带一路”的投资和基建项目就很难在欧亚大陆全面展开。一条原本通往日本的俄罗斯天然气管道现已改道中国，并成为中俄深化合作的标志。
与此同时，中国也利用西方自由主义遭受质疑的机会，推行自己的新世界观。自2008年金融危机以来，西方国家经济复苏缓慢，暴露了它们的脆弱性，包括部分人群预期寿命下降、生活水平停滞不前、传统的联盟体系走向破裂等。中国大大方方地拿出了另一套方案，主张通过加强国家干预来改善民生，推出集体福祉高于个人欲望的价值体系。另外，西方主导的秩序建立在排他性的军事联盟之上，中国正在努力绕开它们，或冲淡它们的影响。
不过，中国也不能简单地放弃中美经贸关系。总有一天，中国需要对全球贸易体系投桃报李，从中取得多少收益，就做出相应的贡献。这或许意味着中国将增加进口，并严格保护知识产权。但在短期内，不要指望中国按特朗普政府的要求去改变法律或放弃现有发展模式，那是不现实的。
美国方面应该试图理解中国看问题的角度。作为一个有5000年历史的古老文明，中国明白欲速则不达的道理，越是渴望达成协议越会失败，唯有保持耐心和距离感，方能取得最终的胜。这将是中国近期乃至未来许多年内的战略指导方针。
The Art of Wait and See
Those now hoping for an eventual trade deal between China and the United States should not hold their breath. Contrary to what US President Donald Trump seems to think, the Chinese have not reached their wits’ end, and will not suddenly accede to his demands.
A successful negotiation usually requires that each side understand the other’s perspective. One can question the wisdom of China’s approach to the dispute thus far, but without a deeper apprehension of the country’s short- and long-term thinking, little progress will be made.
Trump’s supporters insist that he should be taken seriously, not literally. Chinese leaders seem to agree. They have shrugged off the Trump administration’s excessive and unreasonable demands, but harbor little doubts about its intent: to keep China down. That objective has little to do with specific business concerns, and may even derive from “civilizational” – if not racist – hostility. The Chinese thus have had to adjust their strategic calculus, both in the short and long run.
Beyond the latest “truce” between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, China’s overall approach to the trade dispute is to play it cool. The Chinese have realized with hindsight that appearing too eager for a deal made them look weak and vulnerable during the earlier stages of the conflict. They now know that if you give Trump an inch, he will try to take a mile. After China offered major concessions in the last round of talks in May, the US threatened to impose still more tariffs on Chinese exports; and even with the new truce, existing tariffs remain in place.
The Chinese government would hate nothing more than to resemble the court of the Qing Dynasty in its decline. Hence, its current wait-and-see strategy is premised on two judgments. First, the Chinese have concluded that Trump’s flailing truculence will continue to wreak havoc on the US economy, potentially forcing him to back off in the run-up to the 2020 US presidential election.
Second, the Chinese know that Trump’s recent declaration of victory over Mexico was an act of theater in response to growing market jitters; the latest US-Mexico deal was based almost entirely on previously concluded agreements and fictitious Mexican concessions that exist only in Trump’s Twitter account. At any rate, China is not going to rush to make concessions when market unease could force a change in the US position at any moment.
More to the point, given Chinese leaders’ doubt that the Trump administration’s real interest is in making a deal, rather than in undercutting China’s economy, they will have prepared for another breakdown in the negotiations. To manage the economic costs of the trade war, China has already activated a number of compensatory levers, many of which are not available to the US. These include fiscal and monetary stimulus, measures to encourage more lending, and a strengthening of the Chinese financial system. And this, in turn, has allowed for a weakening of the renminbi to offset the competitive disadvantage stemming from tariffs.
In the emerging Chinese view, any leverage or advantage the US has over China in trade is far exceeded by the Chinese people’s willingness to withstand the pressure. They will make the sacrifices necessary to maintain national pride and avoid the appearance of subservience to the West. This patriotic impetus has been fueled further by studying the US-Japanese trade conflict of the 1980s.
“Know your enemy and know yourself,” wrote Sun Tzu in The Art of War, “and you won’t lose a single battle out of a hundred.” Over the years, Chinese leaders have heeded this advice, going to great lengths to understand the internal political dynamics of the US. They know that Trump is tapping into deep-seated domestic fears of China, and that this must be met with strategic realignment, rather than mere tactical management.
Accordingly, the Chinese have accepted that preparing for a protracted trade war will require more than just domestic economic policies and an attitude of self-reliance. China also needs to make new friends and appease former foes, which is why it is mending fences with Japan and – thanks to Trump – Russia. Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of investment and infrastructure projects across Eurasia would not be possible without the Kremlin’s implicit consent. As a sign of China and Russia’s deepening cooperation, a Russian gas pipeline originally heading to Japan has now been rerouted to China.
At the same time, China is taking advantage of doubts about Western liberalism by pushing a new worldview of its own. The West’s vulnerability has been exposed by its slow economic recovery since the 2008 financial crisis, declining life expectancy among some cohorts, stagnant standards of living, and the breakdown of traditional alliances. In exporting an alternative agenda, China is unapologetically advocating increased state intervention to improve livelihoods, as well as a value system that ranks collective welfare above individual desires. It is also making efforts to bypass or otherwise mitigate the effects of the exclusionary military alliances that underpin the Western-led order.
Still, China cannot simply write off economic and trade relations with the US. At some point, it will need to contribute to the global trading system in equal measure to what it has gained from that system. This may mean importing more and getting serious about intellectual-property protection. But in the near term, it is unrealistic to expect China to change its laws or abandon its development model, as the Trump administration is demanding.
The US, for its part, should consider the Chinese perspective. China, a 5,000-year-old civilization, knows that those desperate for a deal will end up losing in the end, while those who remain patient and aloof will come out on top. That stance will guide China’s strategy, both in the near term and in the years to come.
