《世界报业辛迪加》7月26日刊登耶鲁大学高级研究员、前摩根士丹利斯亚洲主席蒂芬·罗奇文章《中国的长远眼光》
文：Stephen Roach
译：李翠萍
今年五月时，中国国家主席习近平考察了位于江西的中央红军长征出发纪念馆，他勉励大家：“现在是新的长征，我们要重新再出发！”在某种意义上，他这番话也是对愈演愈烈的中美经济摩擦的一种回应。
在中国，领导人讲话的象征意义往往比字面意思更重要。1934年，红军正是从这里踏上了万里长征之路，并最终于15年后战胜了国民党。习主席重提长征，体现了中国最大的优势：眼光长远。
我最近一次造访中国是在七月初，切身感受到了中国的这种优势。通过一系列会议和讨论，我得出了三个结论，每一个都与美国共和、民主两党对妖魔化中国的叙述截然相反。
首先，尽管中国经济增速放缓，但与许多西方决策者想象的不一样，中国领导人并不太担心增长问题。的确，从历史的角度来看，中国最近的GDP增长的确显得乏力：季度增长创下自1992年采用现行统计报告制度以来新低，甚至低于十年前全球金融危机最严重的时期。2019年第二季度同比增长6.2%，这个增速比起前八个季度有所保留的平均增速6.7%，略微下降了0.5个百分点。相比之下，反倒是今年第一季度的增速放缓至6.6%更令人担忧，因为它与前八个季度的平均增长速度12.1%相比，降幅达5.5个百分点。不论如何，经济增速的轻微减缓都称不上经济增长的崩溃。
这其实并不奇怪，与不利于增长的因素相比，中国掌握着更多促进增长的政策杠杆，政府有足够的空间进一步实行货币宽松政策，增加基础设施支出，以及采取其它形式的财政刺激。因此，中国政府并不像美国希望世人相信的那样担心经济增长出事。
此外，华盛顿方面紧盯贸易战的输赢，却忽视了中国经济至关重要的结构性转变。2018年，净出口仅占中国GDP的0.8%，与十年前占实际GDP7.5%的净出口相比，比例上已经大幅缩减。在全球经济走弱的大背景下，中国尽管不能说风景这边独好，但如今它受贸易冲击的风险要比十年前小得多。别说中国不一定输掉贸易战，哪怕它真的输掉，整体经济增长所受的损害也将微乎其微。
与此同时，5月24日央行、银保监会接管包商银行，导致交易对手风险蔓延，这还是中国近20年来首次发生此类事件。作为一间中等规模的“私人银行”，包商银行的问题似乎出在管理腐败上面，其坏账率超过了30%。在央行和银保监会协调接管之下，包商银行造成的直接损害已经得到控制，同时也向违规放贷机构发出了重要的道德风险信号。不过，溢出效应仍然导致银行间拆借市场仍不稳定，波及了农村地区一些小型银行。或许与维持金融系统稳定相比，中国还是更擅长管控贸易风险。
我从中国之行得出的第二个结论是，中国在处理外部（尤其是美国政治）的不确定因素时，极具耐心和条理。中国政府在为应对贸易冲突制定战略时，不会对美国2020年总统大选的结果“下注”。中国当然高度关注选举结果，但不论最终谁当选，中国都已经开始做“新长征”的准备，即准备长期与美国进行类似冷战的对抗。
值得注意的是，许多中国高级领导干部并不认同美国对2020年以后对华政策的共识，许多美国人认为不管特朗普能否连任，2020年美国对华政策方向将保持大体不变。但许多中国人认为，如果特朗普落选，美国外交政策可能回到重视多边主义、重视联盟建设的老路上来。他们最希望看到的是美国决策程序本身的完整性得到修复。
与许多美国人一样，中国人也认为美国的关税和制裁政策不可预测、朝令夕改应付起来很头疼。如果下一届美国总统还要继续实施对华强硬政策，那么美国最好能有连贯的、明确的战略，这样才能有效制定辩论框架以及更有建设性地解决现有问题。
第三，华为事件对中国来说是一件大事。这家科技巨头是中国的明星企业，象征着中国自主创新的努力，而自主创新对于中国实现长期增长和发展的目标具有核心意义。特朗普政府利用美国企业在华为供应链中的关键位置来获取优势，这种做法被中国视为试图扑灭其国家抱负的遏制行动。
随着美国通过向AMD、IBM、Marvell、英特尔、谷歌和微软等半导体芯片、零部件和软件供应商施加压力来挤压华为的供应链，此举毫无疑问令华为感到很难受。据华为管理层称，该公司今明两年的收益将比预期低300亿美元左右。
关于是否放宽对华为的限制，美国高级官员发出的信号模棱两可，但美国把贸易政策当作武器的做法则向中国传递了明确的信息：必须优先解决先进科技公司供应链的脆弱性问题。
西方的传统观点认为，中国需要十年时间才能建立属于自己的芯片和软件产业，填补因美国限制造成的空白。但从我此番中国之行来看，许多人认为中国可以更快地缩小与美国的差距，甚至可能在两年内实现这一目标。如果一定要说特朗普威胁华为有什么影响的话，那就是它给中国敲响了警钟，让人们响应习近平“走自力更生道路”的号召。美国卡中国脖子是暂时的，时间之短可能将出乎许多人意料。
中国人明白风物长宜放眼量的道理，这种长远眼光一再与美国短视的行为形成鲜明对比。而过去两年半以来特朗普推特治国的做法，使这种差异愈加明显。一名中国政治制定者告诉我，他每天早上都查看特朗普的推特。这不奇怪，毕竟孙子在《兵法》里就说过，“知己知彼，百战不殆”。
China’s Long View
A couple of months ago, while touring Jiangxi Province, Chinese President Xi Jinping made reference to an old revolutionary milestone. “Now there is a new Long March, and we should make a new start,” he said in response to the mounting economic conflict with the United States.
In China, symbolism is often more important than literal interpretation of leaders’ elliptical statements. Spoken in the same province where the Long March commenced in 1934, ultimately leading to Mao’s defeat of the Nationalists 15 years later, Xi’s reminder underscored China’s greatest strength: the long view.
That strength was on display during my latest visit to China in early July. In a series of wide-ranging meetings and discussions, three conclusions stood out. Each challenges America’s bipartisan demonization of China.
First, slowing growth is not the source of fear for China’s leaders that many Western policy makers seemto think it is. Yes, in historical perspective, the latest GDP report was weak: quarterly growth was the slowest since the current statistical reporting system was adopted in 1992, and even worse than that recorded a decade ago, in the depths of the global financial crisis. But the 6.2% rate for the second quarter of 2019 was a relatively mild deceleration of 0.5 percentage point from the relatively subdued 6.7% average pace of the previous eight quarters. By contrast, the slowing to 6.6% in the first quarter of 2009 was a far more abrupt deceleration of 5.5 percentage points from the average gain of 12.1% over the preceding eight quarters. A modest slowing is not a growth collapse by any stretch of the imagination.
That should not be surprising. China has more policy levers than growth headwinds. With ample room for further monetary easing, infrastructure spending, and other forms of fiscal stimulus, Chinese authorities are far less concerned about a sudden growth accident than the US narrative would lead one to believe.
Moreover, Washington’s fixation on who is winning the trade war overlooks a critically important structural shift in the Chinese economy. In 2018, net exports were just 0.8% of China’s GDP, which represents a dramatic compression from a decade earlier, when net exports accounted for fully 7.5% of real GDP. While hardly an oasis in a weakening global economy, China is far less exposed to a trade shock today than it was back then. Even if it loses a trade war – a debatable proposition – damage to China’s overall economic growth would be minimal.
At the same time, the May 24 Baoshang Bank failure –a first for China in about 20 years – has triggered a worrisome outbreak of counterparty risk contagion. With bad debts ballooning in excess of 30%, this privately-owned Inner Mongolian midsize institution was apparently victimized by corrupt management. A well-coordinated takeover by China’s financial regulators and the central bank appears to have contained the direct damage while sending an important moral hazard signal to undisciplined lenders. But the interbank borrowing market is still shaky, with spillovers to smaller banks, including those in rural areas. Ironically, China may be better able to manage trade risks than instability in its financial system.
The second conclusion that stood out from my recent discussions is that China is patient and methodical indealing with external wild cards – especially US politics. Chinese officials are not about to bet on the 2020 US presidential election in formulating their strategic response to the trade conflict. Obviously, there is great interest inthe outcome; but in keeping with Xi’s Long March imagery, China’s leadership is preparing for an enduring Cold-War-like confrontation, irrespective of who wins the election.
Significantly, many senior Chinese officials don’t share the US consensus view that America’s post-2020 China policy trajectory will stay its current course – Donald Trump or not. In the event that Trump loses, the Chinese suspect that US foreign policy will shift back to a more multilateral, alliance-focused approach. Their biggest hope is for a restoration of integrity to the policymaking process itself.
Like many in the US, the Chinese find it difficult to deal with unpredictable, almost whimsical, shifts in tariffs and sanctions. Even if a new president were to remain tough onChina, a coherent and well-articulated US strategy would be far more effective in framing the debate and offering hope for constructive resolution of grievances.
Third, Huawei is a big deal for China. The tech giant is perceived to be a national champion and emblematic of China’s push toward indigenous innovation, which is central to its longer-term growth and development aspirations. By taking advantage of its“choke point” position in the Huawei supply chain, the Trump administration’s China containment campaign is seen as seeking to stifle those aspirations.
There is no question that Huawei is feeling the heat as the US squeezes the supply-chain by putting pressure on America’s leading suppliers of semiconductor chips, other components, and software – companies such as AMD, IBM, Marvell, Intel, Google, and Microsoft. According to Huawei’s management,the company’s earnings this year and next will be about $30 billion below projections.
While senior US officials have sent mixed signals about relaxing restrictions on Huawei, the weaponization of US trade policy has sent a clear message to China: the need to address the supply-chain vulnerability of its leading-edge technology companies is now a top policy priority.
The conventional wisdom in the West is that China will need ten years to build a domestic chip and software industry that could fill the void created by US restrictions. The Chinese I spoke with in early July felt that the gap could be closed much sooner, possibly within two years. If anything, Trump’s threats against Huawei have served as a wake-up call to Xi’s “self-reliance” campaign. The US chokehold could be surprisingly short-lived.
Time and again, the long view in China has stood in sharp contrast to America’s short-term approach. Needless to say, this has become all the more evident during the past two and a half years of Trump’s Twitter-driven policy gambits. One senior Chinese policymaker actually admitted to checking Trump’s Twitter feed each morning. No surprise there. Sun Tzu put it best in his ancient treatise, The Art of War: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.”
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